Can a new national peace policy fix Nigeria’s security problems?
By Adesewa Olofinko, published by Global Voices, 8 September 2026. News feature, Nigeria.
Read the original on Global Voices
Republished under the Creative Commons Attribution licence, CC BY 3.0. Text only: images, links and page navigation removed; image captions kept as text.
Analysed by Claude Opus 5.5 · 15 November 2026
ACC. H. O. Idoko, Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) representative, speaking at the National Peace Policy review in Abuja, 4-6 August, 2026. Photo by Triple Peace Africa. Used with permission.
The world is spending more on war and defense than ever before. Global military expenditure reached a record USD 2.7 trillion in 2024, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) , as governments increased spending amid wars in Europe and Western Asia and growing security tensions elsewhere.
Africa is part of that trend. Military expenditure on the continent rose by 8.5 percent in 2025 to USD 58.2 billion. Nigeria’s spending rose even more sharply, increasing by 55 percent to USD 2.1 billion, according to SIPRI.
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Yet for Nigeria, a bigger defense budget has not resolved a problem that has become increasingly dire. The country is confronting insurgency, banditry, mass kidnapping, communal violence, and rising organized crime, with the nature varying significantly from one region to another. Between July 2025 and June 2026, at least 7,825 people were abducted in 1,713 kidnapping-related incidents nationwide, and at least 1,142 people were killed. In July, President Bola Tinubu approved the recruitment of 28,000 additional soldiers and the creation of new army divisions, the latest in a series of moves to expand the country’s security forces.
This situation is driving the review of the country’s National Peace Policy, a framework intended to bring greater coordination to conflict prevention and peacebuilding while addressing some of the conditions that allow violence to take root and recur.
Dr. Sanda Julie, Director-General, Plateau State Peacebuilding Agency, speaking at the National Peace Policy review meeting held in Abuja, Nigeria, August 4-6, 2026. Photo by Triple Peace Africa. Used with permission.
Rethinking Nigeria's approach to peace
Nigeria’s first attempt at a National Peace Policy dates to 2012 , when the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) led the process and produced a draft. That policy was never formally adopted or operationalized. With a population of more than 240 million people and hundreds of ethnic and linguistic groups, Nigeria is one of the world’s most diverse societies . That diversity is in itself not a source of conflict. But political competition, disputes over land and resources, communal tensions, weak institutions and perceptions of exclusion often interact in the country, turning local grievances into violence.
Through August, government agencies, peacebuilding organizations, development partners and technical experts met in Abuja and in three geopolitical zones — Kano , Enugu and Lagos — to review the old policy and shape a new one that would connect federal, state and local actors.
Chris Ngwodo , director-general of Nigeria's Office for Strategic Preparedness and Resilience (OSPRE), speaking with Global Voices in Abuja, Nigeria, says the goal is to fold conflict prevention into the country’s broader security architecture and look beyond the visible violence of armed confrontation toward the conditions that produce it.
“There are many forms of violence that are not overt violence,” he said, citing structural inequality, failures in the justice system, government neglect and a lack of opportunity as quieter but no less corrosive drivers of conflict.
Ngwodo frames the policy around a familiar idea that peace is not merely the absence of conflict but the presence of justice.
“Structural violence is invisible. Nobody can see it, but it’s present,” he said. “Subjective violence is what happens when people start fighting.” The new policy, he explained, is meant to address both by anchoring itself in restorative, retributive, and distributive justice and in equalizing opportunity.
Asked whether a new policy would solve Nigeria's security problems, Ngwodo didn't hesitate: “It will not.” What the document can do, he argued, is shift the country’s position from reactive firefighting toward predictive architecture by asking not just how to respond to violence, but why certain places are predisposed to it and why it keeps coming back.
“People are not fighting because they are inherently violent,” he said. The real drivers, in his account, are usually governance failures, lapses in justice administration, long-standing grievances, neglect, and limited opportunity.
Since the last policy attempt, Nigeria’s peacebuilding landscape has grown considerably. OSPRE itself didn’t exist in 2012, nor did the state peace commissions that now operate across the country. The task now, Ngwodo said, is aligning that infrastructure and scaling it up.
L-R: Director General, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Dr Joseph Ochogwu, Chairman, House Committee on peacebuilding and social cohesion, Sadiq Tafida, Special Adviser to the Nigerian president on Homeland security, Maj Gen Adeyinka Famadewa (Rt), and Director-General, Office for Strategic Preparedness and Resilience, Chris Ngwodo at the National Peace Policy review stakeholders meeting in Abuja, Nigeria. Photo by Triple Peace Africa. Used with permission.
Beyond the military response
Nigeria has long contributed to regional peacekeeping through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and via troops and diplomats deployed to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Sudan and Côte d’Ivoire. At home, however, the government’s response to insecurity has leaned heavily on the military.
At the Abuja meeting, the presidential adviser on homeland security, Maj General Adeyinka Famadewa (Rt), said Nigeria could not “shoot its way out” of its security problem. He added that while military operations can disrupt armed groups and retake territory, they’re poorly suited to resolving the political, economic, and social conditions that let violence return once an operation winds down.
A representative of Germany’s development agency, GIZ African Union Office, Chijioke Iwuamadi , made a similar case for prevention, arguing that investing in prevention and long-term peacebuilding could be more effective and less costly than repeatedly responding to crises after they erupt.
Can Nigeria afford to prevent violence?
Nigeria does not have a single conflict. It has many overlapping and regionally distinct ones. An insurgency in the northeast has run for more than a decade while banditry and mass kidnapping have destabilized rural communities in the northwest and elsewhere. Communal violence and organized crime follow their own logic.
These fault lines interact. Religion intersects with ethnicity. Land disputes become communal conflicts. Political competition deepens existing grievances , while migration, demographic change and social media, with its capacity to spread misinformation and inflammatory narratives , add further strain. That regional variation is why the policy review followed zonal consultations in an attempt to reflect local differences while still producing something that can operate nationally.
According to the Director General of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Joseph Ochogwu, institutionalized coordination and a clearly mapped roadmap for the implementation of peace efforts across the country’s geopolitical zones would help avoid duplication, resource wastage, institutional rivalry, and communities falling through the cracks .
Nigeria is already spending heavily to respond to insecurity. Military spending rose sharply through 2025, with no inherent contradiction between building military capacity and investing in prevention. But the two operate at different points in the cycle of violence. One responds to threats, the other tries to reduce the conditions that generate them, and Nigeria has to decide how to divide its attention and resources between them.
More than a decade after the first policy attempt, the country’s security landscape has changed. It faces more varied forms of insecurity, with a wider range of responses from government institutions, peace commissions, and civil society organizations. Whether that coordination can translate into fewer conflicts and prevent existing ones from returning will depend on what happens after the consultations end.
The analyses
All 5 analyses by Claude Opus 5.5: the lenses that found something worth reading in this article. Open one to see what it found.
Intent Analysis
The article steers readers to see prevention and justice-based peacebuilding as a needed, cheaper complement to Nigeria's mostly military approach to insecurity.
Summary
The article examines Nigeria's review of its National Peace Policy amid rising violence and sharply higher military spending. It quotes officials and partners arguing that prevention and justice must complement military force. It notes that a 2012 draft policy was never adopted and that success depends on implementation.
- •Nigeria's military spending rose 55 percent to USD 2.1 billion, per SIPRI.
- •At least 7,825 people were abducted and 1,142 killed between July 2025 and June 2026.
- •Tinubu approved 28,000 more soldiers and new army divisions in July.
- •Asked if the policy will solve security problems, OSPRE's Ngwodo said: "It will not."
- •Consultations were held in Abuja, Kano, Enugu and Lagos.
Steered to see:
The article steers readers to see prevention and justice-based peacebuilding as a needed, cheaper complement to Nigeria's mostly military approach to insecurity.
Played down:
The piece notes that the 2012 policy was never adopted and that the official leading the effort says the new policy will not fix insecurity, but it treats both as minor points.
Technique:
It opens with record spending figures set against worsening violence, then lets officials make the case for prevention ("shoot its way out", "less costly") with no dissenting voices, before ending on a cautious note about implementation.
Evidence
“Yet for Nigeria, a bigger defense budget has not resolved a problem that has become increasingly dire.”
Setting spending against results casts the military-heavy approach as insufficient.
“Nigeria could not “shoot its way out” of its security problem.”
A senior security official's voice gives weight to the case for prevention.
“will depend on what happens after the consultations end.”
The closing hedge keeps the piece cautious rather than promotional.
Omissions
The article never explains why the 2012 peace policy was never adopted, which is the key test of whether this attempt will fare better.
The article never explains why the 2012 peace policy was never adopted, which is the key test of whether this attempt will fare better.
In this piece on Nigeria's peace policy review, the coverage relies almost entirely on officials and partners running the process, and it leaves out why the 2012 draft failed, what the new policy will cost, and whether it will be funded or binding. That tilts the picture toward a hopeful, process-focused story with no independent critique.
What’s Missing
The article notes the 2012 draft was "never formally adopted or operationalized" but never explains why it stalled, or what has changed to stop the new one meeting the same fate.
Why it matters: Without the reasons for the earlier failure, readers cannot judge whether the new review is likely to become real policy or another shelved document.
Where to look: IPCR records, past reporting on the 2012 draft, and independent peacebuilding analysts.
“That policy was never formally adopted or operationalized.”
The headline asks whether the policy can fix security problems, and a section asks "Can Nigeria afford to prevent violence?", but the article gives no budget, funding source, legal status, or adoption timeline for the new policy.
Why it matters: The affordability question goes unanswered, so prevention looks like a viable rival to military spending without any evidence that resources will follow.
Where to look: Federal budget documents and statements from OSPRE or the National Assembly on adoption and funding.
“Nigeria has to decide how to divide its attention and resources between them.”
Every quoted voice is a government official or a partner involved in the review. The article includes no affected communities, independent analysts, or critics of how the government has handled insecurity.
Why it matters: The policy's framing and prospects reach readers only through its own architects, which leaves out skepticism about implementation and state capacity.
Where to look: Independent Nigerian security researchers, civil society groups, and community representatives in conflict zones.
Critique
The case rests on coordination and prevention, but it names no money, no legal force and no lead agency. That leaves it open to the same fate as the 2012 draft, which was never put into practice.
This judges the decision the article reports, not the article.
The case rests on coordination and prevention, but it names no money, no legal force and no lead agency. That leaves it open to the same fate as the 2012 draft, which was never put into practice.
What the decision sets out
Nigeria is reviewing its National Peace Policy to fold conflict prevention into its security setup and tackle root causes such as injustice, neglect and lack of opportunity. Officials argue that sharply higher military spending has not stopped kidnappings and killings, that force cannot fix the conditions that let violence return, and that prevention is cheaper and more effective. The policy aims to coordinate federal, state and local peace bodies that did not exist when the 2012 draft stalled.
Assessment: Aiming to prevent recurring violence by tackling its local causes is the right goal for a country whose conflicts differ by region. Building the policy on existing state peace commissions and zonal consultations gives it a realistic base to coordinate from.
Does it hold up?
- •key flawThe case says nothing about why the 2012 draft was never adopted or put into practice. The new policy relies on the same kind of document to drive change, so the earlier failure is a direct risk to its central aim.
- •key flawThe case for prevention rests on the claim that it is cheaper and more effective, yet no budget, funding source or agency with authority is named. That matters because military spending is still growing alongside it, with 28,000 new soldiers approved.
- •minorThe policy aims to fix deep drivers such as unequal access to justice, government neglect and lack of opportunity. These depend on ministries, courts and the economy, which a peace-coordination framework does not control. Its own lead official concedes it 'will not' solve the security problem.
- •minorUsing rising military spending next to worsening violence as evidence leaves out other explanations. The spending may have been too recent or too small to show results yet, so the comparison alone does not show that force is the wrong tool.
A better approach
Adopt the policy by law, with a set budget and one agency in charge
Pass the policy through the National Assembly, give OSPRE or IPCR clear lead authority over state peace commissions, and set aside a fixed share of the security budget for prevention. Add yearly public targets for each zone. This guards against the stall that sank the 2012 draft and gives prevention real money.
Trade-offs: Passing a law is slower, and moving funds away from the military will draw resistance while attacks continue.
Historical Parallels
Kenya's slow-adopted National Peace Policy (drafted 2009, adopted 2014) suggests Nigeria's new policy will succeed or fail on local implementation, not on paper.
Kenya's slow-adopted National Peace Policy (drafted 2009, adopted 2014) suggests Nigeria's new policy will succeed or fail on local implementation, not on paper.
Nigeria's attempt to pair a military buildup with a national prevention framework rhymes closely with past efforts to bolt peacebuilding architecture onto security-heavy responses. The strongest match is Kenya's National Peace Policy, which existed as a draft for years before adoption and then depended on local peace committees. Colombia's 2016 peace-and-territory approach is a looser fit. Both suggest the document matters less than funding, coordination and follow-through at the local level.
Historical Parallels (2)
Kenya's National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management
Period
Drafted c.2009-2011, adopted as Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014
After the 2007-08 post-election violence, Kenya drafted a national peace policy to coordinate district peace committees, a national steering committee and early-warning systems. The draft sat for years before Parliament adopted it.
Parallels
Like Nigeria's 2012 draft, it spent years unadopted. It also tried to coordinate a crowded field of state and civil-society peace actors and to shift the state from reacting to violence toward preventing it.
Differences
Kenya's conflicts were mostly communal, pastoralist and electoral, not a long jihadist insurgency. It is also a smaller federation-free state, so there were fewer layers of government to align.
How it ended
Local peace committees helped calm several flashpoints, and the 2013 and 2022 elections were far less violent. But uneven funding left many committees weak, and violence in places like the northern rangelands persisted.
Lessons
Adoption is a milestone, not a solution. Sustained budgets for local structures decided where the policy actually worked.
Colombia's 2016 peace accord and territorial development programs (PDETs)
Period
2016-present
Colombia paired military pressure with programs targeting neglected rural regions where armed groups recruited, aiming to fix the land, justice and opportunity gaps behind the conflict.
Parallels
It shares the same diagnosis that you cannot 'shoot your way out' of a crisis, a focus on structural drivers, and a regionally tailored approach.
Differences
It was built on a negotiated settlement with one main rebel group. Nigeria has no such deal and faces many fragmented armed actors.
How it ended
The FARC demobilized, but slow rural investment let other armed groups and criminal networks fill the gaps, and violence rose again in several regions.
Lessons
Prevention promises without fast delivery let other armed actors move into the space the state leaves empty.
Themes
- •Policy documents outpacing the money and institutions needed to implement them
- •Military gains reversed when the state fails to follow through with governance
- •Local peace bodies as the real test of national frameworks
Kenya's peace architecture grew mainly out of one shock, the 2007-08 election violence, and dealt mostly with communal and electoral conflict. Nigeria faces a jihadist insurgency and profit-driven kidnapping economies, which local dialogue committees handle poorly.
Synthesis
A measured explainer that leans toward prevention by quoting only the policy's own architects, while leaving funding and past failure unexplained.
A measured explainer that leans toward prevention by quoting only the policy's own architects, while leaving funding and past failure unexplained.
A calm, decently sourced explainer that lets the people building Nigeria's peace policy make the case for it, then politely skips the two questions that would test it: why the last one died, and who pays for this one.
A chorus of insiders
The bias and omissions lenses agree on the piece's main tilt. The presidential adviser says Nigeria cannot "shoot its way out", a GIZ representative calls prevention more effective and "less costly", and the IPCR chief argues for coordination. Each is attributed properly, but all sit inside the process or back it, and all make the same argument. No independent analyst, sceptic or member of an affected community appears. The effect is that the prevention case reaches readers mostly from its promoters and meets little resistance, even though the narration itself stays measured.
Flagged by: Bias · Omissions
“said Nigeria could not “shoot its way out” of its security problem.”
“made a similar case for prevention, arguing that investing in prevention and long-term peacebuilding could be more effective and less costly”
“According to the Director General of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), Joseph Ochogwu, institutionalized coordination and a clearly mapped roadmap”
What checks out: The manipulation lens found no steering techniques, and the scientific, legal and moral checks flagged nothing. The piece keeps its headline question open, notes that military and prevention spending are not inherently in conflict, and gives prominence to Ngwodo's flat "It will not". Spending figures are attributed to SIPRI. None of these checks verified the article's claims against outside sources. (Persuasion · Science · Legal · Moral)
Synthesized from 10 analyses: Bias (low) · Persuasion · Intent · Omissions (medium) · Critique · Science · Legal · Moral · Background · Parallels
